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Exemptions of Contract Liability Under
the 1980 United Nations Convention
Wanki Lee*
I. Introduction
A difficult problem in the field of contracts, especially in inter-
national sales contracts, frequently arises when an unexpected event
hinders performance of the contract. Traditionally, this problem oc-
curs "when unforeseen occurrences, subsequent to the date of the
contract, render performance either legally or physically impossible,
or excessively difficult, impracticable or expensive, or destroy the
known utility which the stipulated performance had to either
party."'
Many theories on this problem have been developed in different
countries under the labels of impossibility, Act of God, frustration,
force majeure, and failure of presupposed conditions. But none has
yet been generally accepted. This is because the theory of frustration
always produces some kind of conflict with the well-established rule
pacta sunt servanda (agreements to a contract must be observed)
which "is so axiomatic a rule that any doctrine, purporting or seem-
ing to encroach upon it and to offer relief from an express promise,
meets with resistance, distrust, and after with rejection." 2
But under some circumstances, the non-performance of contrac-
tual obligation is excused under the laws of most countries. There
are some general characteristics which are found in these laws in all
national jurisdictions; these include: (1) the circumstance arises after
the conclusion of the contract; (2) for which neither party is respon-
sible; and (3) is regarded by the law as a valid excuse of perform-
ance.' There has been an effort in the last few decades to unify the
laws of various jurisdictions. The United Nations Convention on
* S.J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania, 1989;
M.C.L., The Dickinson School of Law, 1988; LL.B., Korea University, Seoul, Korea, 1981.
1. Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 287 (1958) [hereinafter Smit].
2. Id. at 288.
3. Schmitthoff, Frustration of International Contracts of Sale in English and Compara-
tive Law, in SOME PROBLEMS OF NON-PERFORMANCE AND FORCE-MAJEURE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTRACTS OF SALE 127, 128 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, ed. 1961) [hereinafter
Schmitthoff].
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Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in 1980 is the most
important result of such efforts.
There are many inherent problems in interpreting and applying
the Convention. Therefore, most international trade contracts con-
tain a clause which excuses the parties' non-performance if it oc-
curred by some circumstances which are "beyond their control" and
unforeseeable at the time the contract is made.'
This article will primarily discuss the United Nations Sales
Convention. In interpreting the Convention, the central problem is to
what extent Article 79 of the Convention will apply to the various
cases. Does it apply only to cases of "force majeure" or "impossibil-
ity," i.e., cases in which there is a barrier that prevents performance
or makes it impracticable? Or does it apply to cases of "frustration"
or "impr~vision," i.e., cases in which there is no barrier but the cir-
cumstances are radically changed because of a contingency contrary
to the basic assumption on which the contract was made? Even if
Article 79 does not deal with the latter cases, a question still arises:
Does Article 79 exclude such grounds for excuses, or is this problem
left to domestic laws or liberal contract construction? The interpre-
tation of concepts such as "impediment," "beyond his control," and
"unforeseen" is also a problem.
The Suez Cases will also be examined because the losses result-
ing from the blocking of the Canal led to important and difficult
litigation about the exemption of contract obligations. Since these
cases were originally decided under British and United States laws,
the theories of frustration in those countries will initially be
discussed.
II. British Law
In Britain, the origin of the law of frustration can be traced to
the seventeenth century decision of Paradine v. Jane5 which expands
the rule of absolute liability for performance. At that early stage of
contract law, the court refused any modification of the obligations
which had been set in the original contract in consequence of super-
vening events beyond control of the parties.' The court held that the
duties created by a party in his own contract could not be excused in
spite of any contingency because he might have protected himself by
providing some special clause in his own contract. This strict view
was changed in the 1863 decision of Taylor v. Caldwell.7 In this
4. Berman, Non-performance and Force Majeure in International Trade Contracts, in
SOME PROBLEMS OF NON-PERFORMANCE AND FORCE-MAJEURE ON INTERNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS OF SALE 31, 32 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, ed. 1961) [hereinafter Berman].
5. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
6. Schmitthoff, supra note 3, at 31.
7. (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
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case, the court refused to apply the absolute contract theory and in-
stead, established an "implied condition" theory which excuses the
parties if the "implied condition" at the time of making the contract
has been changed. The attitude of the Taylor court to restrict the
doctrine of frustration to physical impossibility of performance was
changed to extend to legal impossibility.8 In 1944, Lord Wright
challenged the "implied condition" theory stating:
[t]he court has formulated the doctrine by virtue of its inherent
jurisdiction, just as it has developed the rules of liability for neg-
ligence, or for the restitution or repayment of money where oth-
erwise there would be unjust enrichment . . . . The doctrine is
invented by the court in order to supplement the defects of the
actual contract. 9
Lord Wright rejected the view that the doctrine of frustration was
founded on the autonomy of the parties' will, and took the view that
the doctrine was made by the courts to reconcile the principle of
sanctity of contracts with those special exceptions which justice de-
manded. 10 In other words, Lord Wright's theory denied the basic po-
sition that courts do not make contracts for the parties but simply
enforce them as made." However, this view was dismissed by the
House of Lords in British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District
Cinemas Ltd." In this case, the House of Lords unanimously re-
versed the decision of the Court of Appeals which had decided the
case using the Lord Wright's theory.
Some years later, Lord Radcliffe used a "radically different"
test in Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council
holding that:
frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without de-
fault of either party a contractual obligation has become incapa-
ble of being performed because the circumstances in which per-
formance is called for would render it a thing radically different
from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in
foedera veni. It was not this that I promised to do.' 3
In order to say the contract is frustrated under the test of the
changed significance of the obligation,' there must be a radical
change of circumstances which had the parties anticipated would
8. Schmitthoff, supra note 3, at 33.
9. Denny, Mott & Dickinson v. Fraser & Co. [1944] A.C. 256, 215.
10. Schmitthoff, supra note 3, at 134.
1I. Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things-The Doctrine
of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419, 426 (1969) [hereinafter Schlegel].
12. [1952] A.C. 166.
13. [1956] A.C. 695.
14. Named by Lord Radcliffe himself in Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban Dis-
trict Council, [1956] A.C. 696, 729.
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have led them to make a new and different contract. The English
theory of frustration regards the contract as altogether terminated in
terms of exemption.15 This system looks for a failure to perform the
entire contract not on one or more of the party's obligations (partial
non-performance) as in the theory of force majeure in French law."8
There are two laws concerning frustration of contract in Eng-
land. One is the English Sales of Goods Act of 1893 which covered
only a small part of the substantive law of frustration. The other is
the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act of 1943.17 The Sales of
Goods Act treated only cases involving frustration of contract to sell
generic goods. This Act provides that an agreement to sell specific
goods is avoided if the goods perish without any fault of the parties
before the risk has passed to the buyer. The Law Reform Act ex-
tended its scope to all instances of frustration except those covered
by the Sales of Goods Act. The Law Reform Act provided that par-
ties could recover any down payments or other benefits exchanged
before the time of frustration and that the judge could divide be-
tween the parties reliance expenses incurred in contemplation of the
performance of the contract.' 8 But this Act dealt only with the forms
of judicial relief after the recognition of frustration, leaving the sub-
stantive rules of frustration untouched.
III. United States Law
In the United States, as in Britain, there are many theories con-
cerning the problem of frustration, although the law is still vague
and uncertain. The absolute liability theory derived from the English
case, Paradine v. Jane, became more flexible by the end of the nine-
teenth century. First, American courts have developed the rule that
impossibility due to unforeseeable circumstances excuses non-per-
formance. Impossibility is sometimes defined broadly to include the
concept of unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved. 9
The assumption that a certain event will or will not occur is the basis
of this doctrine. If this basic assumption proves false, the parties are
exempted from obligations."
Courts and scholars also recognize a theory of frustration of
purpose, a theory that exempts a defaulting party when the circum-
15. In civil law systems, on the other hand, only French law takes such an approach.
Exemption from liability in damages is provided.
16. Nicholas, Force Majeure & Frustration, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 231, 234 (1979) [here-
inafter Nicholas, Force Majeure & Frustration].
17. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40, §§ 1-3.
18. See Law Reform (Frustration Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40, §§ 1(2),
(3).
19. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932).
20. Berman, supra note 4, at 1421 n.17.
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stances are so "radically changed" that performance would be vitally
different. Notably, a distinction has been made between frustration
of performance and frustration of purpose. The former includes cases
in which performance has become impossible, extremely difficult, or
too expensive; the latter also embraces cases where the known pur-
pose which was the basis of the contract has been destroyed even
though performance may not be impossible or even too difficult or
expensive."
The doctrine of frustration has been incorporated into both the
First and Second Restatement of Contracts.22 In the Second Re-
statement, the party who wants to be exempted on the ground of
frustration of purpose must meet four requirements: (1) the principal
purpose of the party must have been substantially frustrated; (2) the
parties must have a basic assumption, on which the contract was
made, that the event would not occur; (3) the frustration must have
resulted without the defaulting party's fault; and (4) the party must
not have assumed a greater obligation than the law imposes.2"
Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) deals,
to some extent, with frustration of contract. Under the title of "Ex-
cuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions," section 2-615 provides
that delay in delivery or non-delivery by the seller is excused under
three conditions: (1) if there should be an occurrence of a contin-
gency; (2) if the non-occurrence of a contingency was a basic as-
sumption of the contract; and (3) if the performance agreed to in the
contract should have been made impracticable by the occurrence of
the contingency.24 UCC 2-615 provides an excuse only for the seller,
and only with respect to two aspects of performance: "delay in deliv-
ery" and "non-delivery." However, there has been support for a
broader approach based on the general principles of frustration. 5
The "Black and White" rule26 of termination of contract has
prevailed in American courts even though it was changed by legisla-
tion in England. 7 For the possible unjust situation resulting from
this absolute common law rule, "excuse" or "non-excuse," Comyment
21. Smit, supra note 1, at 287 n.4. In most civil law systems, strict impossibility is dis-
tinguished from frustration. Generally, specific remedy is provided in statutory provisions for
strict impossibility but not for frustration.
22. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 288; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
265. (1981).
23. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 691 (1982).
24. UCC § 2-615(a).
25. UCC § 1-103; see Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa
1976). In this case, the court said in dicta that UCC § 2-615 should be "equally applicable to
buyers [since] the code expressly recognizes the doctrine of 'commercial frustration.' " Id.
26. Schmitthoff, supra note 3, at 142. Professor Schmitthoff characterized the judicial
practice that the declaration of frustration meant termination of the contract with no down-
payments or reliance expenses being recoverable. Id.
27. Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Compara-
tive Law, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 551, 559 (1980) [hereinafter Rapsomanikis].
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6 to the section 2-615 states:
. . . adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is
necessary, especially the sections on good faith, on insecurity
and assurance and under reading of all provisions in the light of
their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equita-
ble principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good
faith.
The UCC imposes some obligations on the discharged seller: to
tender a commercially reasonable substitute;28 to notify the buyer
about the delay or the non-delivery reasonably; 29 and to allocate the
part of the production unaffected by the contingency among his cus-
tomers, with his option to include regular customers not then under
contract in any manner which is fair and reasonable."
A rise or a collapse of price in the market does not excuse a
party. Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless it oc-
curs by some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential na-
ture of the performance. 1
UCC § 2-613 rules on casualty to goods identified when the
contract was made (specific goods). UCC § 2-614 provides for the
effect of failure of agreed means of transportation or payment when
a "commercially reasonable" or "substantial equivalent" substitute
is available; this provision saves the contract by providing that the
equivalent substitute must be tendered.
IV. Suez Canal Cases32.
On July 26, 1956, President Nasser of Egypt announced the na-
tionalization of the Suez Canal, then owned by the French-managed
Suez Canal Company. The Canal had been one of the most impor-
tant commercial passages for shipments from the Middle East to Eu-
rope. From October 28, 1956, heavy fighting between Egyptian and
Israeli forces took place in the Sinai Peninsula. Great Britain and
France bombed by air various targets in Egypt just after the ultima-
28. UCC § 2-614.
29. UCC § 2-615(c).
30. UCC § 2-615(b).
31. UCC § 2-615 comment 4.
32. There are seven cases after the first closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and two cases
after the second closure in 1967. See Carapanayoti & Co. v. E.T. Green Ltd., [1959] 1 Q.B.
131 (1958); Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Throl G.m.b.H., [1962] A.C. 93 (H.L. 1961); Al-
bert D. Gaon & Co. v. Soci6td Interprofessionalle des OI6agineux Fluides Alimentaries, [19601
2 Q.B. 348 (C.A.); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960); Soci&6t
Franco Tunnisienne d'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A., [1961] 2 Q.B. 278 (1960); Ocean Tramp
Tankers Corporation v. V/O Sovfracht, [1963] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 155, affd, [1964] 2 Q.B.
226 (C.A. 1963); Transatlantic Financing Corporation v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Palmco Shipping, Inc. v. Continental Ore Corp., [1970] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 21
(1969); American Trading Production Corp. v. Shell International Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939
(2d Cir. 1972).
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turn was delivered on October 30, 1956. A general cease-fire took
effect on November 7, 1956; by that time, the Canal was blocked by
over forty sunken ships, and it was likely that the Canal would be
closed for a period of time.33 In fact, the Canal was closed for some
five months until April 1957, when it was reopened through the aid-
of the United Nations. To provide some background for analyzing
Article 79 of the 1980 U.N. Sales Convention, four cases will be
discussed in some detail.
A. Carapanayoti & Co. Ltd. v. E.T. Green Ltd.34
Carapanayoti and E.T. Green entered into a contract for the
sale of Sudanese cottonseed cake on September 6, 1956. The sellers
agreed to sell to the buyers cottonseed cake and to ship from Port
Sudan during October or November at the sellers' option, c.i.f. Bel-
fast. Clause 17 of the contract provided: "In case of prohibition of
export, blockade or hostilities . . . preventing fulfillment, this con-
tract or any unfulfilled portion thereof so prevented shall be can-
celled." 5 When the Canal was closed, the sellers refused to perform
their contract obligations. The buyers sued for breach of contract.
An arbitrator held for the buyer. The Court of Queen's Bench re-
versed the arbitrator's decision, and held the contract frustrated. The
court ruled that the contract had been frustrated because of funda-
mental differences in the sellers' obligation (voyage around the Cape
of Good Hope, not by way of the Canal) and that the contract could
also be excused by means of the clause 17 of the contract.36 More-
over, the parties regarded the availability of the Canal as a "funda-
mental assumption" and could not foresee the contingency.
The "fundamental difference" test makes the court's decision
reasonable 7 because it can be said that the distance is changed fun-
damentally enough from the fact that the original distance of 4068
miles changed to 10,793 miles after the closing of the Canal. 38 Fur-
thermore, there is no foreseeability present in this case since there
had not been any closure of the Canal before the time the contract
was entered into, and there was no hostile action when the contract
was made. The problem in this case is that the contract included
c.i.f. terms. One may argue that "a c.i.f. contract casts the risk of
non-shipment upon the seller even when shipment is rendered physi-
cally impossible . . . unless by an event covered by the excuse clause
33. Socite Franco Tunisienne d'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A., [1961] 2 Q.B. 278, 286
(1960).
34. [1959] 1 Q.B. 131 (1958).
35. [1959] I Q.B. 131, 132 (1958).
36. Id. at 149.
37. Rapsomanikis, supra note 27, at 583.
38. [1959] 1 Q.B. 131 (1958) at 142.
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or by some other clauses in the contract;"89 yet, to impose such a
risk on the seller may be too burdensome. A c.i.f. contract should be
interpreted so that a seller incurs the risk of normal freight increase.
The seller in this case could, therefore, be exempted even though he
had executed a c.i.f. contract. 40 Furthermore, the seller can be ex-
cused by clause 17 of the contract.
B. Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.41
Glidden, a manufacturing company, and Hellenic Lines had en-
tered into four charter parties for transportation of ilmenite from
Koilthottam, India to a United States Atlantic port north of Cape
Hatteras. The first charter party was to be delivered on September
7, 1956, the remainder delivered on November 1, 1956. The contract
had a force majeure clause which would exonerate Hellenic in case
of closing of the Canal. Also incorporated was section 4 of the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act,"4 which absolved the carrier of responsi-
bility for loss resulting from an "act of war" or "any other cause
arising without actual fault . . . of the carrier."
The trial court, relying upon the Carapanayoti case, decided
that the agreements were frustrated by the closing of the Suez Ca-
nal. But the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the judgment of the trial court, reasoning that alternative
routes specifically referred to in the agreements were available to
Hellenic's ship,43 and, therefore, the provision of the contract relat-
ing to force majeure and section 4 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act had no applicability. In other words, there is no room for the
theory of frustration; thus, the only thing left is to interpret the con-
tract provisions. To interpret ambiguous clauses in the contract, the
court examined the surrounding circumstances (evidence of the ne-
gotiations) which revealed that the carrier had unsuccessfully
pressed for the inclusion of a specific clause. The court held that the
carrier should perform using an alternative route in case of the clos-
ing of the Canal."'
However, this problem must be solved by the contract itself, not
by the circumstantial evidence. If there are no express terms and no
inference can be made from the contract itself, then one should use
prevailing commercial custom relating to the allocation of the risk of
non-performance resulted from the same contingency. 5 In any event,
39. Berman, supra note 4, at 1422 n.21.
40. See UCC § 2-320 comment 7.
41. 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960).
42. 46 U.S.C. § 1304.
43. 275 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1960).
44. Id. at 257.
45. Berman, supra note 4, at 1424 n.26.
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the decision in this particular case was fair and reasonable since the
seller had decided not to perform at all instead of performing via an
alternate route and asking for compensation for added cost. In short,
the court concluded that the carrier bore the risk of the closing of
the Canal because the carrier did not expect to be excused without
an express provision. 6
C. Socit Franco Tunisienne D'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A. 47
Shipowners and charterers made a charter party on October 18,
1956 for the carriage of iron ore from India to Genoa. The material
clauses of the charter party are:
2. That the ship . . . shall . proceed with all convenient
speed to Genoa . . .3. Freight to be paid at and after the rate
of 134 s. per ton .. . 37 . . . captain also to telegraph to
"Marutsider Genoa" on passing Suez Canal."8
The vessel sailed for Genoa on November 19, 1956, and the next day
the shipowners informed the charters that the charter party was
frustrated by the blocking of the Canal and demanded higher freight
in order to proceed via the Cape of Good Hope. The shipowners con-
tended that an agreement was to be inferred, after the original con-
tract had been frustrated, and that the charters would pay a reason-
able remuneration for the carriage of the cargo. But when the
voyage was completed, the charterers refused to pay more than the
contract rate and contended that the charter party was not frus-
trated. The arbitrator held that the contract was not frustrated. The
reasoning was that the performance of the voyage via the Cape of
Good Hope was not commercially or fundamentally different from
the performance via the Suez Canal, and that the continued availa-
bility of the Suez Canal was not a basic assumption of the charter
party.
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and held that the
charter party was frustrated. The court awarded the shipowner a
reasonable remuneration in quantum meruit. The court said that the
parties' appreciation of the frustrating event at the time of the mak-
ing of their contract did not affect the contract being frustrated by
the event when it did occur because "the possibilities appreciated by
both parties at the time of making their contract, that a certain
event may occur, is one of the surrounding circumstances to be taken
into account in construing the contract, and will, of course, have
greater or less weight according to the degree of probability or im-
46. Id.
47. [1961] 2 Q.B. 278 (1960).
48. [1961] 2 Q.B. at 281.
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probability and all the facts of the case."49 In interpreting clause 37
of the contract, the court saw an obligation to pass through the Suez
Canal. The court also said that the voyage via the Cape of Good
Hope was a fundamentally different voyage from the one via the
Suez Canal. The court held that the route by way of the Cape is
highly circuitous, unnatural, and different in a number of other re-
spects.50 The court distinguished the charter party from a c.i.f. con-
tract, in cases like Carapanayoti, saying that in charter cases, in ad-
dition to the freight and duration of the voyage, which should also be
considered in a c.i.f. contract, 51 additional hazards to the crew, to
the ship, or to the goods are the factors to be considered.
The effort of the court to differentiate the charter party from
the c.i.f. contract is not so persuasive because the court eventually
focused on a "fair and reasonable" result, as in the c.i.f. contract
cases. Unlike the Glidden case, the shipowner had not refused to
perform, but rather had agreed to go around the Cape demanding a
reasonable remuneration, the court decided so as to provide the ship-
owner with a "fair and reasonable' result. One can argue that there
was no specific route of the voyage in the contract; the phrase "on
passing" in the clause, "captain to telegraph . . . on passing Suez
Canal," could mean "if" the Suez Canal is passed instead of
"when." 2 Therefore, there would be no obligation to go through the
Suez Canal, but only to go by the route which was customary at the
time of performance. However, the court interpreted differently. The
court could only give answers and results about this kind of frustra-
tion problem without giving any meaningful reasons. This may have
resulted from the lack of standards for frustration.
D. Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v. V/O Sovfracht (The
Eugenia)63
Shipowners and charterers entered into a time charter party on
September 9, 1959 for a "trip out to India via Black Sea." There
was a war clause in the charter party (clause 21(a)) which read:
The vessel, unless the consent of the owners be first obtained,
not to be ordered nor continue to any place or on any voyage nor
be used on any service which will bring her within a zone which
is dangerous as the result of any actual or threatened act of war,
war, hostilities, warlike operations . . .
49. Id. at 303.
50. Id. at 304, 307.
51. Id. at 308.
52. Berman, supra note 4, at 1427.
53. [1963] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 155, afftd, [1964] 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A. 1963).
54. [1964] 2 Q.B. 226, 234 (C.A. 1963).
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Both parties appreciated that the Suez Canal might be closed at the
time of negotiating the charter party, but failed to insert any express
term for that contingency. After delivering the vessel, The Euge-
nia, they tried to sail her from Odessa to India through the Suez
Canal which was still the customary route. The Eugenia arrived at
Port Said which, at that time, was considered as a "dangerous zone"
within the clause 21. The Eugenia entered the Canal on October 31,
1956, and was trapped when Egyptian Government blocked the Ca-
nal by sinking ships and blowing up bridges. Early in January 1957,
the passage was cleared northwards. On January 4, 1957, the char-
terers claimed that the charter party had been frustrated by the clos-
ing of the Canal. The owners, however, denied this and treated the
charterers' conduct as a repudiation.
The court faced two questions; first, whether the charterers
breached the war clause by allowing The Eugenia to go into the Ca-
nal and second, whether the charter party was frustrated. The trial
court held that the charterer breached the war clause reasoning that
since it was a "self induced" blockade of the vessel; the charterer
could not rely on it as relevant to frustration. For the second ques-
tion, the court made a hypothetical situation that the vessel had
never entered the Canal but stayed at Port Said. The court held the
contract frustrated in this hypothetical case applying the "funda-
mental difference" test used in the Sidermar case. On appeal, the
court of appeals affirmed that the charterer had breached the war
clause.
However, in determining the second question, the court reversed
the decision of the trial court overruling the Sidermar decision. The
court discarded the "unforeseeability" requirement saying that the
only thing important is the existence of the contractual provision.
The court could apply the "fundamental difference" test since there
was no provision relating to frustration in the contract, and held that
the changed obligations (extended voyage) was not sufficient to hold
the contract frustrated. This case is another example in which the
court tried to get to the just result before giving a meaningful
reasoning. 51
V. United Nations Sales Convention
As in American and British legal systems, the concept of ex-
emption for the non-performing party is found in the United Nations
Convention. Article 79 of the Convention deals with the exemption
of a party's liability when the party failed to perform his obligations
55. Id. at 233.
56. Id. at 237.
57. Rapsomanikis, supra note 27, at 590.
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if the failure is due to an impediment beyond his control.
Article 79 is the result of the compromise by delegations from
various countries and does not follow a single domestic theory on
frustration. This makes it very difficult to interpret Article 79 since
one cannot resort to a domestic law as a guide. 8 Furthermore, Arti-
cle 7 of the Convention provides that one should interpret the provi-
sions in the Convention "with regard for its international character
and . . . the need to promote uniformity in its application." Profes-
sor Honnold said "this goal would be served if we could . ..purge
our minds of presuppositions derived from domestic tradition, and,
with innocent eyes, read the language of Article 79 in the light of
the practices and needs of international trade." '59
A. Scope of Article 79
Article 79, unlike the UCC, 0 provides that either party (seller
or buyer) can be exempted of his obligations. All the obligations of
the buyer and the seller, whether under the Convention or under the
contract, can be exempted.6" In other words, Article 79 provides a
general cause of exemption for non-performance of any obligations,
and applies to any kind of obligations generated by a contract of sale
of goods. Like civil law systems, the Convention also provides ex-
tended rules on excuse to all aspects of a party's performance. 2
If the impediment existed at the time of the conclusion of the
contract and was known to the defaulting party, Article 79(1) would
not apply to this defaulting party. The defaulting party might "have
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion."
One problem is how to handle contracts for sales of specific
goods which were already destroyed at the time of contracting with-
out the knowledge of either party. Cases which deal with specific
goods which are destroyed subsequent to the time of contracts but
before the risk of loss is passed to the buyer clearly come within
Article 79; in these cases, the sellers can treat the contracts frus-
trated because they are impossible to perform. But for the former
cases, various opinions come from various jurisdictions. In France,
for example, this problem will be solved under the theory of condi-
tion of validity. The existence of the subject-matter is regarded as a
condition of validity. In this situation, the contract will be declared
58. Tallon, Exemptions, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE
1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 574 (C. Bianca & M. Bonnell, eds., 1987) [hereinafter
Tallon].
59. J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION 429 (1982).
60. UCC § 2-615.
61. Seller's obligations are stated in Article 30 and buyer's are listed in Article 53.
62. J. HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 430.
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void. Therefore, there is no place for Article 79 of the Convention
because the problem of validity is not governed by the Convention
according to Article 4(a).
It is also possible to treat this problem under the theory of mis-
take in some other systems.63 Under this theory, the contract will
also be declared as void. On the other hand, the UCC of the United
States treats this problem under § 2-613. This governs the frustra-
tion of contract for the sales of goods which is identified at the time
of contracting." UCC § 2-613 reads: "If the loss is total, the con-
tract is avoided." Thus, if we follow the view of the UCC, Article 79
will apply to this problem. However, if we follow the French view,
Article 79 will not apply because of Article 4(a), which says that the
Convention will not apply to the problem of validity of contract. The
Secretariat's Commentary stated that Article 79 applies to this prob-
lem without any explanation. 5
It is desirable to interpret Article 79 extensively for the uni-
formity. However, there is a conflicting problem between the Con-
vention and some of the domestic laws which require the existence of
the subject-matter as a rigorous rule. Because of this conflict, it
seems better to decide that Article 79 will not apply to this problem
by virtue of Article 4(a) of the Convention. 6
B. Elements of Article 79
Article 79 states:
(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his
obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impedi-
ment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time
of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome
it or its consequences.
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third
person whom he has engaged to perform the whole or a part of
the contract, the party is exempt from liability only if;
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph;
and
(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be
so exempt if the provisions of that paragraph were ap-
plied to him.
63. Tallon, supra note 58, at 578.
64. See § 2-613 Comment 2.
65. OFFICIAL RECORDS 1, 55; see also P. SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE
UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 101 (Vienna:
Manzsche Verlags and Universitgtsbuchhandlung, 1986) [hereinafter P. SCHLECHTRIEM].
66. Tallon, supra note 58, at 577-78. Article 34 of ULIS excluded reliance on national
remedies for mistake in case of non-conforming goods.
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(3) The exemption provided by this article has effect for the
period during which the impediment exists.
(4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the
other party of the impediment and its effect of his ability to per-
form. If the notice is not received by the other party within a
reasonable time after the party who fails to perform new or
ought have known of the impediment, he is liable for damages
resulting from such non-receipt.
(5) Nothing in this article prevents either party from exer-
cising any right other than to claim damages under this
Convention.
Three elements must be proved by a non-performing party who
contends that he is not liable for failure to perform under paragraph
(1) of Article 79: (1) the failure was "due to an impediment beyond
his control;" (2) "he could not reasonably be expected to have taken
the impediment into account at the time of conclusion of the con-
tract;" and (3) he could not reasonably be expected "to have avoided
or overcome [the impediment] or its consequences."
1. Due to an Impediment Beyond His Control. (a) Impedi-
ment.-Non-performance should be "due to an impediment" to get
an exemption. The Vienna Conference seems to have adopted the
word "impediment" to emphasize the objective nature of the hin-
drance rather than its personal aspect. Regarding the definition of
"impediment," there is a serious problem which was discussed at the
1964 Hague Conference and UNCITRAL17 proceedings: "may a
non-negligent seller be excused from liability when he delivers defec-
tive goods?" '68 To answer this question, a look to the legislative his-
tory of Article 79 would be helpful. The 1956 Draft provided that
the non-performance must result from an "obstacle." At the Hague
Conference in 1964, a civil law group, led by the Federal Republic
of Germany, proposed to eliminate the word "obstacle" because they
wished to permit the exemption not only by "supervening and exter-
nal events" but also by "extreme and onerous change in economic
circumstances."69 The outcome of the discussion was the ULIS Arti-
cle 74 which states:
1. Where one of the parties has not performed one of his obliga-
tions, he shall not be liable for such non-performance if he can
prove that it was due to circumstances which according to the
intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the con-
tract, he was not bound to take into account or to avoid or to
overcome; in the absence of any expression of the intention of
67. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
68. J. HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 430.
69. Id. at 431.
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the parties, regard shall be had to what reasonable persons in
the same situation would have intended.
It was possible to interpret Article 74 of ULIS as exempting the
seller for unknown defects. This problem was revived in the discus-
sion of the UNCITRAL Working Group 70 and in the Vienna Con-
ference. The word "impediment" was adopted 1 instead of the word
"circumstances" which implies, like "obstacle," an external barrier
to performance rather than personal aspects of the seller's perform-
ance. Thus, the exemption does not apply to defective performances
such as supply of non-conforming goods.72 This problem should be
solved under Article 35 which governs conformity of the goods.
In defining the concepts of "impediment," we must decide
whether the concept of "impracticability," which means radically
changed conditions without any barrier to performance, is governed
by Article 79. This is the area of "imprkvision" or "frustration." In
common law, the notion of "frustration of the venture" comprises
both "impossibility" (Act of God) and "imprbvision." Sections 261
and 265 of Restatement Second on Contracts show this trend by re-
ferring to the notion of "impracticability" which covers "impossibil-
ity" and "frustration." 73
However, this extensive approach does not seem to be the view-
point of the Convention. Article 79 provides the general question of
exemption from just "impossibility," even though the concept of
"impossibility" is interpreted somewhat broadly, not from frustration
of purpose. Thus, Article 79 does not deal with the question of
whether a defaulting party can claim an exemption from liability
because of the theory of frustration of purpose or imprbvision. When
courts envisage this problem, they may be tempted to refer to a simi-
lar concept in their own law. Yet, this approach will not be consis-
tent with the Convention's basic idea of international unification. 74
In other words, courts should not use domestic laws first, even
though Article 79 of the Convention does not deal with the problem.
Article 7(2) permits using a domestic law only as a last resort after
using the general principle on which the Convention is based. There-
70. 5 UNCITRAL Yearbook 39-40 (1974); 6 UNCITRAL Yearbook 60-61 (1975).
71. The world "impediment" is also adopted in the final text of the Convention.
72. J. HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 432; Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL
SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 5-14 (N. Gaston & H. Smit eds. 1984) [hereinafter Nicholas, Impracticability and
Impossibility]. Nicholas does not agree with this view. See Nicholas, Force Majeure and
Frustration, supra note 16, at 240. Professor Huber also interprets "impediment" differently.
He said the changes from "circumstances" to "impediment" was not significant. id. at 5-11.
Nicholas cites Huber, Die UNICTRAL-Entwurf eines Ubereinkommens iber international
Warenkaufvertrage, 43 RabelsZ 413, 165 (1979); Tallon, supra note 58, at 509.
73. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 690; Tallon, supra note 58, at 593.
74. See Article 7(l).
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fore, when this last stage is approached, it is necessary to use domes-
tic law as guidance in comparative law approach, i.e., prevailing pat-
terns and trends of domestic law.75 This comparative law approach
will contribute to the goal of the Convention: "to promote uniformity
in its application. ' 76 Moreover, this approach will practically prevent
parties from "forum shopping."
The next problem is whether economic difficul-
ties-unaffordability--can be an impediment under Article 79 of the
Convention." This problem was treated in the UNCITRAL discus-
sions.78 The general view of the UNCITRAL was that a party could
be exempted under both physical and economic impossibilities. Pro-
fessor Schlechtriem 79 suggests that one should "treat radically
changed circumstances as 'impediment' under Article 79 in excep-
tional cases in order to avoid the danger that courts will find a gap in
the Convention and invoke domestic laws and their widely divergent
solutions." The "impediment" in Article 79 of the Convention can-
not be interpreted only as an occurrence that absolutely bars the ob-
ligor's performance. It should be interpreted to include economic dif-
ficulties, such as unaffordability.
(b) Beyond his control.-According to Article 79(1), an exemp-
tion is permitted only when the impediment to performance is be-
yond the obligor's control. Regarding the concept of "beyond his
control," the problem is how to treat, under Article 79, the damages
that defects in the goods would cause to the buyer. The seller may
contend that the defect, especially from a remote supplier, was be-
yond his control. But to the extent that the impediment relates to the
defaulting party's activity, it is not "beyond his control." Because of
this "external approach," the "non-external" impediment cannot be
a cause of exemption even though it meets other conditions.8"
(1) Causal element.-The non-performance of the contract
must be "due to" the impediment. The exempting event must neces-
sarily be the exclusive cause of the failure to perform. It is some-
times difficult to find out what was the precise cause of the failure
when there were several causes. Since both the Convention and the
general principle on which the Convention is based do not point out
on this effect, the solution will depend on the judge's decision. The
judge will use a domestic law by virtue of the rules of private inter-
75. J. HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 434.
76. Article 7(1).
77. See P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 65, at 102.
78. 5 UNCITRAL Yearbook 39, 66-67 (1974); 6 UNCITRAL Yearbook 84-85 (1975);
8 UNCITRAL Yearbook 57 (1978)§ 459; id. at 135 § 24; id. at 160 § 14.
79. P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 65, at 102 note 422a.
80. Tallon, supra note 58, at 580; see also J. HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 430-32.
[Vol. 8:3
EXEMPTIONS OF CONTRACT LIABILITY
national law. 81
(2.) Foreseeability.-To be an impediment which can give the
defaulting party an exemption, the event should not be foreseeable at
the time of the conclusion of the contract. If the event were foresee-
able, the defaulting party might have considered the risk of its reali-
zation. Foreseeability should be perceived at the time of contracting,
and if the impediment were reasonably foreseeable, the defaulting
party cannot be exempted. The Convention anticipates a reasonable
man, who would decide the foreseeability, not an extreme pessimist
nor a resolute optimist. This impersonal tone of the text of the Vi-
enna Convention is different from the ULIS which referred to the
intention of the parties. The detail measurement of the foreseeability
is left to a judge or an arbitrator depending on the circumstances of
the case. This is because it seems difficult to provide more details in
the Convention. 2 Furthermore, foreseeability must relate not only to
the impediment per se but also to the time of its occurrence. The
Suez Canal cases are the examples which the closure of the Canal
was foreseeable in a more or less distant future.
(3.) Unavoidability.-The impediment must also be unavoida-
ble. A defaulting party must have been reasonably unable "to have
avoided or overcome [the impediment] or its consequences." Thus, in
order to claim an exemption under Article 79 of the Convention,
there should be an unforeseeable impediment which is out of the ob-
ligor's control and his reasonable effort to take all the necessary
steps to avoid the impediment, or to overcome the consequences of
the impediment. Thus, unavoidability will frequently coincide with
the concept of "beyond his control." The "reasonable person" test is
also the basis of reference as for unforeseeability.
This criterion, however, has difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween what is possible and what is impossible to overcome. Again,
economic impossibility should be considered in solving this problem.
To pick up something lost at sea, for example, is economically im-
possible even though it is not absolutely impossible.
(c) Notice.-Article 79(4) provides that the defaulting party
must give notice to the other party within a reasonable time after the
defaulting party knew or ought to have known of the impediment.
Although there was no provision like this in the ULIS, this rule
seemed to be an international practice.83 The notice is effective upQn
receipt. This means the risk of transmission is on the defaulting
81. Article 7(2).
82. Tallon, supra note 58, at 580-81; Secretariat's Commentary, OFFICIAL RECORDS I,
55.
83. Tallon, supra note 58, at 586.
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party. This is an exception to the general rule of the Convention in
Article 27.84
If the defaulting party fails to notify according to Article 79(4),
he is liable for the damages. The damages in paragraph (4) do not
mean those resulting from the non-performance of the contract, but
those from the failure to give notice to the other party who could
have otherwise taken the necessary steps to reduce the damages of
the non-receipt.
(d) Effects of the exemption.-Paragraph (5) of Article 79 re-
strains the effects of the exemption only to damages. When we read
paragraph (1), it seems that in a case of one party's exemption, the
other party cannot claim any remedy. But paragraph (5) provides
that "nothing . . . prevents either party from exercising any right
other than to claim damages." Thus, "a party is not liable . . ." in
paragraph (1) means that he is not liable for damages. All the other
party's remedies are unaffected. Avoidance and specific performance
are the most important remedies available for the other party.
Let us suppose a fact situation where a seller contracted to
make and deliver goods to a buyer. Because of a certain impediment,
(for example, fire at the seller's factory) the seller cannot deliver the
goods on the date stipulated in the contract. The seller needs more
time to make and deliver the goods (rebuild the factory and manu-
facture the goods). If the impediment was beyond the seller's control
and passed the "reasonable expectation test," the seller is exempted
from the liability @f damages for the delay for the period the impedi-
ment actually exists.85 Yet, the seller should perform his obligations
when the impediment is removed and the buyer has the right to
avoid the contract86 if the delay constitutes a fundamental breach
under Article 25. If the delay substantially deprives the buyer of
what he is entitled to expect, it is a fundamental breach. Notably,
the seller has no right to avoid even though the late performance
would be radically different from the original performance because
of the changed circumstances (for example, the price of the raw ma-
terial rises considerably). With the increased cost itself, the seller
cannot receive an exemption because the increased cost alone does
not constitute an impediment under Article 79 of the Convention.87
Paragraph (3) of the 1978 Draft provided that the exemption
"has effect [only] for the period during which the impediment ex-
ists." Thus, the seller, in our hypothetical case, may be asked to per-
84. There are other exceptions in Article 15 and Article 18(2).
85. Paragraph (3), (5) of Article 79.
86. Article 49.
87. Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility, supra note 72, at 5-17; Comment 4 on
UCC § 2-615; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 131-32 (2d Ed. 1980).
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form, when the impediment is over, no matter how the circumstances
have changed. A proposal was made at Vienna Conference88 to add
to paragraph (3) a provision that the defaulting party is permanently
exempted if during the temporary exemption period the circum-
stances have "so radically changed that it would be manifestly un-
realistic to impose performance at that late stage." This proposal
was most likely rejected on the basis that the delegates did not want
to treat the problems of frustration in the Convention. 89
Yet, the word "only" was deleted from paragraph (3). The in-
tention was to avoid any impression that paragraph (3) laid down a
rigid rule requiring contract relations to rescue on the original basis
no matter how long the impediment existed or how much the cir-
cumstances have changed. With the omission of the word "only,"
Article 79 can be interpreted more elastically when deciding whether
it excludes the theory of frustration as a ground of exemption or not.
Another problem is that even though the defaulting party is ex-
empted from liability in damages, it is possible for that party to be
compelled to perform if the temporary impediment did not make the
performance physically impossible-physically possible but impracti-
cal within the meaning of paragraph (1) of Article 79. Because para-
graph (5) provides that any other remedies except the damages are
available, the defaulting party can envisage the judgment of specific
performance. It means that the impossible performance (under para-
graph (1)) is still actionable as long as the other party does not de-
clare an avoidance on the basis of a fundamental breach under Arti-
cle 49(l).9o Thus, it is possible for the defaulting party to be in the
absurd position in which he is exempted from paying the damages,
but has to pay the fine or penalty which the national courts may
impose for non-compliance-an order for performance. These penal-
ties may exceed the amount of the damages from which the default-
ing party is exempted."1 There was a proposal at Vienna to exclude
the right to compel performance from paragraph (5).92 This proposal
was rejected because of the fear that an exemption from the obliga-
tion of performance could also release collateral rights and interest
claims.93
As Professor Schlechtriem stated, one can get a reasonable limi-
tation of Article 79(5) from the general beliefs expressed in Vienna
that a judgment for a physically impossible performance would be
88. OFFICIAL RECORDS 381-82.
89. Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility, supra note 72, at 5-17.
90. P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 65, at 103; Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibil-
ity, supra note 72, at 5-19.
91. P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 65, at 103.
92. OFFICIAL RECORDS 383-85.
93. OFFICIAL RECORDS 373.
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neither sought nor obtained. Furthermore, a court is not bound to
enter the judgment of specific performance under Article 29 if this
kind of judgment would be contrary to the public policy of that juris-
diction. 9 If a party demands the performance of a contract that has
become impracticable, he would be deemed in bad faith. Paragraph
(1) of Article 7 provides that in interpreting the Convention "regard
is to be had to .. .the observance of good faith in international
trade." If one interprets paragraph (5) with the limitation mentioned
above, there is no grave difficulty with the specific performance.
However, it will be better for the main objective of uniformity to
give a lasting exemption when the impediment is permanent or when
the performance is impracticable after the impediment ceases to
exist.
VI. Conclusion
The United Nations Convention has been a vital step towards
the unification of international trade law. Yet, since it came from a
compromise of various law systems, it has only a limited scope of
application. Article 79 deals with the problem of exemption, but as
we have seen so far, it governs only the exemption from just impossi-
bility not from frustration. Thus, the problem of frustration should
be solved outside of Article 79.
General principles on which the Convention are based will apply
in this situation. In the case of a lack of general principles, domestic
laws in the comparative law approach, which seeks guidance from
prevailing patterng and trends of modern domestic law, will apply.
This comparative law approach may prevent the courts from apply-
ing their own legal systems and promote uniformity in interpretation
and application. This approach also has a difficulty in that some
courts are unable to recognize the legal developments in other coun-
tries. However, as Professor Honnold has asserted, "the realization
that such material is relevant should, at the very least, tend to
broaden and liberate the tribunal's outlook."95
Of course, the best way to solve these problems is to make and
add a provision which governs frustration to Article 79. It should be
carefully drafted so as to be accepted by most countries. Only then
will the uniform customs and practices of the international trade
pierce national barriers. At this time, because of the imperfect unifi-
cation of international sales law, a party who desires to be exempted
when a certain contingency occurs must utilize clear exemption
clauses in the contract to be sure.
94. P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 65, at 103.
95. J. HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 434.
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